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Abstract
Cultural proximity is an important determinant of bilateral trade volumes.
However, empirical quantification and testing are difficult due to the elusive-
ness of the concept and lack of observability. This paper draws on bilateral
score data from the Eurovision Song Contest, a very popular pan-European
television show, to construct a measure of cultural proximity which varies
over time and within country pairs, and that correlates strongly with conven-
tional indicators. Within the framework of a theory-grounded gravity model,
we show that our measure positively affects trade volumes even if controlling
for standard measures of cultural proximity and bilateral fixed effects.
JEL classification: F12, F15, Z10
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1 Introduction
There is wide-spread agreement that cultural proximity plays an important
role in determining trade flows between countries. The literature has used
different variables to proxy cultural ties, such as common language, religion,
or ethnicity (Boisso and Ferrantino, 1997; Frankel, 1997; Melitz, 2008). 1 While
those variables clearly capture cultural proximity, they also reflect other trade-
creating factors, such as the cost of communication.
In this paper, we exploit an original data set that contains information on cul-
tural proximity between European countries. Each year in May, the European
Broadcasting Union organizes the Eurovision Song Contest (ESC). This is a
huge pan-European televised show, where every participating country sends
an artist to perform a song. The other countries grade those songs, either
by televoting, or (in earlier times) by popular juries. Every year, the process
gives rise to a matrix of bilateral votes. Recent research shows that bilateral
votes are strongly affected by conventional measures of cultural proximity,
such as linguistic, ethnic, or religious ties (Ginsburgh and Noury, 2008; Gins-
burgh, 2005; Clerides and Stengos, 2006). However, in contrast to standard
indicators, the ESC scores vary over time and are potentially asymmetric.
ESC scores are informative about a broader concept of cultural proximity that
is close to the definition used by sociologists (Straubhaar, 2002). Cultural prox-
imity relates to the sharing of a common identity, to the feeling of belonging
to the same group, and to the degree of affinity between two countries. The
sociological concept allows for the evolution of bilateral attitudes and moods
over time and for asymmetries within pairs of countries. A country’s citizens
can display respect and sympathy for the cultural, societal, and technological
achievements of another country without this feeling necessarily being recip-
1 Other recent examples include Alesina and Dollar (2000), who use cultural prox-
imity measures in the context of explaining international aid, and Rose (2004), who
studies the effect of WTO membership on trade. In Rauch and Trindade (2002) and
Combes et al. (2005) cultural proximity is measured by the importance of ethnic
ties across countries or regions. There is also a growing literature that correlates
attitudes, sentiments, or customary beliefs to bilateral trade (Disdier and Mayer,
2005; Guiso, et al., 2004). Disdier et al. (2007) use bilateral trade in cultural goods
as a proxy for cultural proximity.
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rocal and ever-lasting. Conventional measures of cultural proximity, such as
common language, ethnicity, genetic traits, or religion are both time-invariant
(pre-determined) and, by construction, symmetric and can therefore not fully
capture the broad notion of cultural proximity.
Our interpretation of ESC scores is in line with anecdotal and systematic
evidence on voting patterns across and within country pairs and over time.
We show that some countries systematically award scores above average to
each other and behave in a reciprocal way. We detect a Nordic, a Balkan, and
a Mediterranean cluster. However, the observed degree of reciprocity can be
low even between countries of seemingly similar cultural attributes, and the
average degree of reciprocity is rather small.
Accounting for the unobserved quality of songs by including song-specific
dummy variables, we discover a statistically significant and economically mean-
ingful relation between bilateral ESC scores and the volume of trade between
two countries. Looking at trade in differentiated goods, moving from the lowest
to the highest degree of cultural proximity increases bilateral trade on aver-
age by 16% in our benchmark regressions. However, when considering trade
in homogeneous goods, which are typically traded on organized exchanges,
ESC scores are unrelated to bilateral trade volumes, signaling the irrelevance
of cultural proximity for promoting trade in that category of goods. Inter-
estingly, however, measures such as common language, common legal system,
or ethnic ties do turn out statistically significant. Since there is little reason
why cultural proximity should foster transactions taking place on anonymous
organized exchanges, we take this finding as evidence that ESC scores strictly
reflect cultural proximity while those other measures have more to do with
other trade-promoting channels, such as the pure costs of translation or con-
tracting.
The time-varying and asymmetric nature of ESC scores allows for a more
elaborate econometric treatment. We can exploit the time dimension in order
to deal with the potential endogeneity of grading behavior, to correct for non-
systematic measurement error in our index of cultural proximity or in order
to control for time-invariant unobserved factors that drive both cultural prox-
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imity and bilateral trade. Following Baier and Bergstrand (2007), we include
dyad-specific fixed effects to control for those initial conditions, thereby nudg-
ing our results nearer to the true causal effect of cultural proximity on trade.
Our results suggest that cultural proximity increases bilateral trade by about
1.2% for differentiated goods, while, as before, it does not increase trade in
goods transacted over organized exchanges. Using time lags as instruments, we
find that OLS models also strongly underestimate the effect of cultural prox-
imity on trade, probably due to the presence of measurement error. Hence, the
central conclusion of our paper is that cultural proximity is a more important
determinant of bilateral trade than researchers usually allow with the sort of
cultural variables they include.
Our paper is related to different strands of the empirical gravity literature. We
frame our analysis in a monopolistic competition trade model close to Combes
et al. (2005), where an asymmetric weighting term in the utility function
allows cultural proximity to affect preferences. The other channel through
which cultural proximity matters is through trade costs. Our econometric
setup follows Baldagi et al. (2003) and Baier and Bergstrand (2007), who
include complete sets of interaction terms of importer/exporter dummies with
year fixed effects into the gravity model. This strategy is a natural extension
of the fixed effects approach discussed by Feenstra (2004). It appropriately
controls for multilateral resistance (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003) and
other sorts of unobserved country-specific heterogeneity.
The received literature acknowledges the importance of the trade-cost and the
preference channels; see Combes et al. (2005). However, that paper deals with
migration and business networks; our exercise is related to a broader notion
of cultural proximity. There are two interesting papers which show that dis-
tance captures more than transportation costs. Huang (2007) disentangles the
distance effect of trade into a transport-cost and an unfamiliarity component.
Blum and Goldfarb (2006) show that distance matters even for services that
are entirely transacted over the internet and relate this finding to a preference
effect. Our paper differs as it focuses on cultural proximity (not geographical
distance), tries to explain patterns in trade in manufactures across Europe
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and pays due attention to endogeneity and identification concerns. 2
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a
thorough discussion of the data and shows how one can use ESC scores to
construct a meaningful measure of cultural proximity. Section 3 derives a
generalized theoretical trade flow equation, which highlights the role of cultural
proximity and which can be applied to bilateral data. Section 4 contains our
core empirical results and shows how ESC scores are related to bilateral trade.
Section 5 provides a number of extensions: it shows that our results are not
driven by possible endogeneity of the ESC scores or unobserved heterogeneity.
Section 6 concludes. Additional material and robustness checks can be found
in our working paper as well as in a web appendix. 3
2 Eurovision Song Contest score data
In this section, we discuss our data and show that the ESC scores are a
meaningful measure of cultural proximity. We also discuss their statistical
properties.
2.1 The setup of the contest and measurement issues
In 1955, a couple of European broadcasting stations represented in the Euro-
pean Broadcasting Union (EBU) founded the Eurovision Song Contest (ESC).
A year later, the first contest took place in Lugano, Switzerland. The idea of
the ESC is that each participating country selects an artist or a group of
artists to perform a song, which is then graded by the other countries.
We focus on the period 1975-2003, in which grading rules have been stable. 4
2 There is also a growing literature on the relation between culture and economic
outcomes; see Fernandez (2007) or Guiso et al. (2006) for comprehensive surveys,
and Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009), Giuliano et al. (2006), Algan and Cahuc (2007)
and Tabellini (2007) for interesting recent papers.
3 The web appendix can be downloaded from
http://team.univ-paris1.fr/teamperso/toubal/papers/CP/CP.html.
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On average, from 1975 to 2003, 21.6 countries participated in the ESC, with
the minimum participation being 18 countries. Contest participants are almost
exclusively European countries. 5 Each ESC is broadcast by television, and
since 1985, this happens via satellite. In 2005, the contest was broadcast live
in over 40 countries to over 100 million spectators. Until 1988, the scores were
decided upon by a jury that is not necessarily consisting of experts. Nowadays,
the scores are national averages obtained through a televoting process with
huge popular participation. There are organizations of ESC fans in all EU
countries.
Since 1975, each country scores the other countries’ performances on a scale
from 0 to 12. The scores 9 and 11 are not allowed and 12 is the highest possible
score. Each of the ten strictly positive grades has to be allocated exactly once;
remaining countries are graded zero. The winner is the country that collects
the largest sum of points.
We argue that ESC scores are broad indicators of cultural proximity. However,
this interpretation poses one major difficulty, since the scores may reflect the
quality of the song. Thus, we assume that country i′s support for country
j′s performance at time t, ESCijt depends positively on the quality of the
song, ζjt, on the degree of country i
′s feeling of cultural proximity towards j
at time t, Π˜ijt. In addition, the rules of the song contest disallow ties for the 10
most popular songs and force ties for the least popular ones. There is therefore
no ordering of ESC scores below the top ten songs. Consequently, a separate
dummy variable, Dijt, is also appropriate for values of ESC equal 0 when
Dijt equal 1. Accordingly, ESCijt = f
(
Π˜ijt, ζjt, Dijt
)
. Correspondingly we
may say
Π˜ijt = f
−1 (ESCijt, ζjt, Dijt) . (1)
Π˜ijt refers here to cultural proximity as it emerges from the song contest
alone. We shall reserve the term Πijt for cultural proximity based onother
indicators as well.
4 Until 2003, the last year in our sample, the contest was organized in a single round.
From 2004 onwards, there are two rounds to accommodate the rising number of
participants.
5 Israel participates on a regular basis and Morocco has participated once. Both
countries are not in our sample.
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2.2 ESC scores as broad indicators of cultural proximity
In this subsection, we show that ESC scores reflect time-invariant components
of cultural proximity. We also argue that their time and within country-pair
variance are in a meaningful way related to the broad definition of cultural
proximity discussed in the introduction.
Ginsburgh (2005) shows that conventional measures of cultural proximity –
linguistic, ethnic, religious, political, etc. ties – determine ESC outcomes to a
large extent, refuting the alternative hypothesis of vote trading (logrolling).
Clerides and Stengos (2006) and Spierdijk and Vellekoop (2008) similarly doc-
ument the importance of culture for scoring outcomes. Haan, Dijkstra, and
Dijkstra (2005) test whether the transition of the grading process from jury-
based voting to generalized televoting has strengthened the role of cultural
proximity and answer this question in the affirmative. Fenn et al. (2006) run a
cluster analysis and find evidence for unofficial cliques of countries along lines
of cultural proximity. 6
Table 1 shows pairwise correlation coefficients between raw and quality-adjusted
ESC scores, on the one hand and conventional measures of cultural proximity
Πijt (excluded from Π˜ijt) on the other. We have rescaled the ESC scores so
that ESCijt ∈ [0, 1] to facilitate comparison with conventional measures of
cultural proximity. 7 The quality-adjusted ESC scores are the residuals from
a regression of raw scores on song-dummies. We consider the following time-
invariant and symmetric measures of cultural proximity used in the literature:
(i) an adjacency dummy and geographical distance between main cities (in
kilometers); (ii) the Melitz (2008) measures of common language, namely; the
continuous direct communication variable and the open-circuit communica-
tion dummy variable; 8 (iii) a dummy for common legal origin borrowed from
6 See also Yair (1995) for an early study of that sort.
7 First, the original score of 10 is set to 9 and the score 12 is set to 10. Then, we
divide all scores by 10. This rescaling does not affect our results.
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La Porta et al. (1999) 9 ; (iv) a continuous religious proximity measure based
on Alesina et al. (2000); (v) a measure of ethnic links based on the stock of
individuals born in country i but residing in country j; Appendix A provides
information on the summary statistics of the variables, their exact definition
and the data sources.
Table 1
Coefficients of correlation between different measures of cultural proximity
ESC score Adjusted ESC score
Adjusted ESC score1 0.8003***
Geographical distance -0.1918*** -0.2528***
Adjacency 0.1839*** 0.2203***
Direct communication 0.1421*** 0.1341***
Open-circuit communication 0.1633*** 0.1861***
Common legal origin 0.1244*** 0.2111***
Religious proximity 0.1317*** 0.1669***
Ethnic links 0.3245*** 0.1968***
1 averaged across years.
Number of observations: 901. *** denotes that coefficient is
different from zero at 1% level of significance
The correlation between the quality adjusted ESC score and the raw ESC
score data is 80.03. Hence, about a fifth of the variance in raw scores is ac-
counted for by quality. The correlation coefficient between both ESC score
measures and the conventional proxies of cultural and geographical proximity
all have the right sign and are statistically different from zero. The adjusted
ESC score displays larger correlation coefficients (with the exceptions of direct
communication and ethnic links), signaling that quality adjustment improves
our index of cultural proximity.
8 Melitz (2008) distinguishes whether ease of communication facilitates trade
through translation or the ability to communicate directly (i.e., face-to-face). The
first possibility is captured by the open circuit communication dummy, which takes
value one if the language is either official or widely spoken (20% of the population)
in both countries (in any combination). The second possibility is captured by a
direct communication measure which obtains by summing up the products of the
respective percentages of speakers over all the relevant languages (at least 4%) in
the two trading countries.
9 Countries that once were part of the same larger political entity (such as, e.g.,
the Czech Republic and Hungary in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, England and
Ireland, or Norway and Denmark) usually have the same legal system. Hence, that
dummy also captures the broad institutional similarity of countries that have had
a common past.
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Table 2
Explaining grading behavior
Poisson Zero
Inflated
Part
Ln Distance -0.150*** 0.011
(0.041) (0.093)
Adjacency -0.162* 0.010
(0.087) (0.207)
Both country in same FTA -0.033 -0.038
(0.041) (0.092)
Direct communication -0.230 -0.020
(0.145) (0.474)
Open-circuit communication 0.333* -0.116
(0.191) (0.448)
Common legal origin 0.147** -0.004
(0.058) (0.129)
Religious proximity 0.248** 0.032
(0.101) (0.211)
Ethnic ties 0.057*** 0.024
(0.017) (0.019)
Observations 10,560
Nonzero obs. 5,135
Zero obs. 5,425
McFadden’s adjusted R2 0.018
Log-Likelihood Full Model -5,919.429
Vuong Test: Zip vs. Standard Poisson 15.80***
The regression contains song dummies and year fixed effects.
Standard errors (in brackets) have been adjusted for clustering
around country pairs. *,**,*** denote statistical significance at
the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
In Table 2, we present the results of a simple regression of ESC scores on
various measures of cultural proximity. In order to account for song quality
(ζjt) we include song dummies that are country-specific; moreover, the equa-
tion also contains year effects. Since we observe the same country pair over
several years, we adjust the standard errors for clustering. ESC scores are
count data censored at zero, so that it is natural to estimate a zero-inflated
Poisson model. 10 Indeed, the Vuong statistic indicates that this model has a
better fit than the standard Poisson model. Interestingly, while all measures
are strongly related to ESC scores in pairwise correlations, the multivariate
10 See Greene (2008, pp. 930-931) for a textbook treatment of the zero-inflated
Poisson model and further references.
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analysis shows that direct communication does not matter for grading behav-
ior. However, the other variables related to cultural proximity replicate the
findings of table 1. Note that none of the measures explains the zero-inflated
part of the Poisson regression.
Table 3 shows that culturally close countries tend to award each other grades
above the average. But the degree of reciprocity is not very high, revealing
important within-pair variance. Table 3 reports the directed pair-specific in-
tercepts νˆij derived from estimating ESCijt = ψjt + ξij + uijt by OLS, where
ψjt is the average score attained by country j at time t and uijt is an error
term. We refer to the empirical estimates of the intercepts ξˆij as excessij since
they measure the excess of the average (over time) score that i allows to j
relative to the overall average (over all countries and time) that j receives.
Table 3 shows selected country relations where excess-grading is statistically
significant at least in one direction. 11 The expected country clustering read-
ily emerges. For example, Cyprus awards to Greece an average of 7.41 points
more than Greece receives on average; Greece reciprocates by awarding an
excess of 6.26 points beyond the Cypriot mean score. Over-generous and re-
ciprocal relationships can be found for many Scandinavian country pairs, and
to a lesser extent for Mediterranean countries. However, relationships need not
be reciprocal: Finland awards Italy an excess 3.10 points, but gets an aver-
age negative excess grade of -0.77 in return. France grades Great Britain 0.86
points below average, while the Brits treat France almost neutrally. 12 Scandi-
navian and Mediterranean countries tend to reciprocally award scores below
the respective averages (with the pair Denmark-Yugoslavia the notable excep-
tion). Not surprisingly, Cyprus and Turkey stand out as two countries that
systematically award each other grades below average. Germany (and Austria)
over-grade Turkey without being compensated; this is likely to reflect ethnic
ties due to migration.
Table 3 reveals an intuitive pattern. Reciprocal positive excess grades occur
within culturally close pairs; reciprocal negative excess grades appear for the
11 See also Table 1 in Clerides and Stengos (2006).
12 This confirms the Duke of Wellington: “We always have been, we are, and I hope
that we always shall be detested in France. ” (cited by Guiso et al., 2007, p. 1.).
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Table 3
ESC scores: Selected deviations from means
Country i Country j excessij std. err. excessji std. err.
CYP GRC 7.41 0.65 6.26 0.65
ITA PRT 3.95 0.63 0.02 0.63
DNK ISL 3.27 0.72 2.05 0.72
FIN ITA 3.10 0.65 -0.77 0.65
DNK SWE 2.99 0.55 1.98 0.55
ISL SWE 2.95 0.65 1.56 0.65
ESP ITA 2.95 0.63 1.70 0.63
CYP YUG 2.67 0.82 2.49 0.82
HRV MLT 2.52 0.78 3.17 0.78
TUR YUG 2.22 0.75 3.21 0.75
DNK NOR 2.04 0.57 0.79 0.57
GER TUR 1.79 0.53 -0.70 0.53
CYP ESP 1.79 0.57 -0.27 0.57
ESP GRC 1.77 0.54 2.62 0.54
ISL NOR 1.71 0.65 1.08 0.65
NOR SWE 1.56 0.50 2.64 0.50
BEL NLD 1.33 0.55 0.30 0.55
AUT TUR 1.12 0.55 -0.21 0.55
FIN SWE 1.06 0.54 0.67 0.54
FRA GBR -0.86 0.49 0.18 0.49
ESP NOR -1.01 0.49 -1.37 0.49
ESP SWE -1.39 0.49 -1.20 0.49
ITA SWE -1.51 0.65 -0.93 0.65
DNK ESP -1.66 0.55 -0.39 0.55
ISR ITA -1.73 0.69 -1.73 0.69
HRV SWE -1.76 0.78 -3.06 0.78
DNK HRV -1.92 0.98 -2.53 0.98
CYP TUR -2.09 0.58 -1.22 0.58
DNK YUG -2.17 0.78 1.34 0.78
Pair-specific intercepts, means adjusted. All estimates are significant at
10 percent level. All country pairs in the table occur at least 10 times
in the data. Excessij denotes the score awarded by i to j in excess to
j’s average score.
usual suspects but are on average smaller than positive excess grades. More-
over, non-reciprocal behavior seems to be quite frequent. The (simple) corre-
lation coefficient between excessij and excessji is 35.07, the Spearman rank
correlation coefficient is 27.81; both measures are statistically different from
zero at the one percent level of significance.
There is plenty of anecdotal evidence that ESC scores reflect changes in atti-
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tudes and moods over time. For example, The Economist described the victory
of Serbia in 2003 and that of Turkey in 2007 as signs that the other Euro-
pean countries perceive Serbia and Turkey as less culturally remote (May
29, 2003; May 17, 2007). The successes of Estonia and Latvia in 2001 and
2002, respectively, received similar comment (May 30, 2002). The success of
Finland in 2006 was associated to the widespread perception of a successful
‘Finnish model’ (July 6, 2006). According to long-time commentator Terry
Wogan from the BBC, the failure of Britain to earn a single point in 2003 was
due to Britain’s decision to back the United States in its attack on Iraq. 13
While the examples cited above mark short-term effects, the data also reveals
long-run trends. For example, the popularity of countries seems subject to
cycles that are difficult to reconcile with underlying movements in musical
quality. For example, The Economist relates the failure of France to win any
contest since 1977 to the loss of French popularity and cultural clout in Europe
(May 12, 2005). The example of Italy offers a similar, but less spectacular,
picture. It is well possible that the popularity of Celtic culture (Ireland) will
suffer the same fate. 14
Gatherer (2006) provides systematic evidence for time shifts in bilateral popu-
larity. He simulates matrices of ‘unbiased’ ESC score outcomes and compares
them to actual voting. He shows that collusive voting alliances, described by
several authors (e.g., Fenn et al., 2005) have shifted over time. The observed
time pattern makes sense: France has lost its early central role to English-
speaking countries (Ireland, Britain), which have then given way to Eastern
Europe.
13 BBC News “Turkish delight at Eurovision win”, Saturday 24 May 2003. More-
over, while all those effects naturally have a country-time dimension, their reception
across Europe and hence their importance for bilateral trade need not be identical.
14 Figure 1 in the web appendix presents the time profile of multilateral unadjusted
ESC scores earned by frequently participating countries.
11
3 Cultural proximity in the gravity model
We base our theoretical model on the multi-country monopolistic competi-
tion model of trade (see Feenstra, 2004, for an overview). Each country i is
populated by a representative individual who derives utility from consum-
ing different varieties of a differentiated good according to a standard CES
function,
Uit =
C∑
j=1
a
σ−1
σ
ijt
njt∑
z=1
(mzijt)
σ−1
σ , (2)
where z denotes the index of a generic variety, njt is the number of varieties
produced in country j at time t and σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution
between varieties. The quantity of consumption in country i of variety z from
country j ismzijt. Following Combes et al. (2005), we allow for a specific weight
aijt ≥ 0 to describe the special preference of the representative consumer in
country i for goods from country j.
All varieties from the same origin bear the same f.o.b. (ex factory) price pjt
(reflecting symmetric production technologies), and iceberg ad-valorem trade
costs payable for deliveries from j to i, tijt ≥ 1, do not depend on the charac-
teristics of the varieties within a sector. Hence, the c.i.f. price (i.e., including
trade costs) paid by consumers pijt = pjttijt is the same for all varieties im-
ported from j. It follows that consumed quantities mzijt are identical for all z
so that we can omit the variety index in the sequel.
Maximizing (2) subject to an appropriate budget constraint, one derives coun-
try i′s demand quantity mijt for a generic variety. Calculating the c.i.f. value
of total imports from country j at time t as Mijt = njtpijtmijt, we find
15
Mijt =
(
aijt
tijt
)σ−1
µitφjt. (3)
The variables µit ≡ EitP σ−1it and φjt ≡ njtp1−σjt collect terms that depend only
on country i′s or j′s characteristics. Pit =
[∑C
j=1
(
aijt
tijt
)σ−1
p1−σjt njt
] 1
1−σ
is the
15 Note that Combes (2007) express imports in terms of quantities not values.
12
aggregate price index and Eit denotes country i
′s GDP.
For our empirical investigation, we do not need to close the model by explic-
itly specifying supply-side and equilibrium conditions. However, we need to
clarify the role of cultural proximity in shaping bilateral trade flows. Cultural
proximity affects the bilateral trade equation (3) in two ways. On the one
hand, it lowers trade costs, tijt: a higher total level of trust, the easier forma-
tion of business and/or social networks, or fewer misunderstandings related to
non-verbal communication make expensive hedging measures and consulting
services redundant. This is the trade-cost channel of cultural proximity. On
the other hand, cultural proximity is also reflected in the bilateral affinity pa-
rameter aijt. A high value of aijt means that the representative consumer in
country i puts a high value on products produced in country j. Equation 3
together with the assumption σ > 1 implies that this situation leads to larger
trade volumes. This is the preference channel of cultural proximity.
In our empirical set up, as indicated earlier, we capture cultural proximity
Πijt by the revealed degree of cultural proximity (quality adjusted) obtained
from the ESC, Π˜ijt, and by the more conventional measures, discussed in
section 2.2, such as linguistic proximity, direct communication DCij, and open
circuit communication OCij, the existence of common legal origins (LAWij),
the intensity of ethnic ties (log of bilateral migrant stock, ETHij), and the
degree of religious proximity (RELij) . Grouping the conventional indicators
into the vector Kij, we posit
Πijt = Π˜ijt + κ′ ·Kij (4)
where κ is a (column) vector of parameters. In principle, all components of
K may be time-varying. However, there is only cross-sectional information
available on these variables. Hence, the ESC scores are the only source of
time-variant information about time-varying cultural proximity.
We now specify how country i′s cultural proximity to country j is related to
bilateral affinity and trade costs. We assume that country i′s preference for
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goods from j, aijt, depends on cultural proximity Πijt in the following way:
ln aijt = αΠijt, (5)
where α > 0. Similarly, we assume that trade costs tijt also depend on Πijt.
However, besides cultural proximity, there are at least three other fundamental
determinants of trade costs: 16 (i) Transportation costs, reflected by geograph-
ical distance (DISTij) and the existence of a common land border (adjacency,
dummy variable ADJij); (ii) formal trade policy, measured by joint member-
ship in a free trade agreement (dummy variable FTAijt); and (iii) costs of
contracting and negotiation. The latter category is closely related to cultural
proximity since higher trust and understanding amongst parties certainly low-
ers transaction costs. However, transaction costs can be low for reasons un-
related to cultural proximity, e.g., if a common legal system facilitates the
write-up of contracts or if citizens in both countries master the language of
some third country. We write iceberg trade costs as
ln tijt = δ lnDISTij − γADJij − ϕFTAijt − piΠijt. (6)
We expect that all parameters δ, γ, ϕ and pi are positive.
Using a linearized version of the ESC score equation (1), together with equa-
tions (4), (5) and (6) in (3), we obtain the following log-linear gravity equation:
lnMijt = ηESCijt
+κ¯1DCij + κ¯2OCij + κ¯3LAWij + κ¯4ETHij + κ¯5RELij
−δ¯ lnDISTij + γ¯ADJij + ϕ¯FTAijt
+νit + νjt +Dijt + εijt, (7)
where η ≡ (σ − 1) (α + pi) , κ¯k = ηκk and κk being the coefficients associated
to each element in the vector Kij, δ¯ ≡ (σ − 1) δ, γ¯ ≡ (σ − 1) γ, ϕ¯ ≡ (σ − 1)ϕ,
and εijt ≡ (1− σ) (α + pi)uijt. The vectors νit and νjt collect importer × year
and exporter × year fixed effects to control for µit, and φjt (both of which have
important unobserved components such as the true price index, the number
of firms, or the price of a generic variety) as well as for song quality. Finally,
16 See Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) for a classification of different types of
trade costs.
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εijt is the error term. The use of fixed effects makes the inclusion of GDP or
price data redundant. It also frees us from the need to think about the choice
of proper deflators for right and left-hand side variables of the gravity equa-
tion. 17 Equation (7) contains only pair-specific variables, because country-
specific ones are perfectly controlled for by country-specific fixed effects. 18
Our main parameters of interest are η and the coefficients of the more standard
measures of cultural proximity κ1 to κ4. These coefficients reflect both the
trade cost (through pi) and the preference channel (through α).
4 Quantifying the role of cultural proximity
In this section, we first show a standard gravity equation without ESC scores,
but with the standard variables such as common language, common legal
origin, religious proximity, and ethnic ties as measures of cultural proximity.
Second, we add ESC scores and show that the time and within-pair variance of
that measure adds explanatory power to the gravity equation. What is more,
we argue that our results suggest that ESC scores indeed reflect cultural prox-
imity, while the standard measures may also reflect the costs of contracting
and negotiation. Third, we document that imports and exports are affected
differently by cultural proximity.
4.1 A standard gravity equation
We estimate equation (7), following the literature where η is exogenously set
to zero since ESC scores play no role. Using the sub-aggregates proposed by
17 Baldagi, Egger, and Pfaffermayr (2003) first proposed the use of interaction
terms between country and time fixed effects in econometric gravity models, with-
out, however, offering a theoretical rationale. The latter follows immediately from
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). Baier and Bergstrand (2007) use a similar
strategy in their work on the effects of free trade agreements.
18 Absent endogeneity concerns (which we address in subsection 5.1), our empirical
strategy allows consistent estimation of average effects; since changes in cultural
proximity affect multilateral resistance terms (price indices) differently, the true
coefficient is not constant across countries (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003).
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Rauch (1999), we distinguish between homogeneous goods and differentiated
goods. Homogeneous goods are defined as goods that are transacted on or-
ganized exchanges. 19 For these goods cultural proximity should be largely
irrelevant.
Table 4 provides the results of running specification (7). All regressions use a
full set of interactions between exporter and importer fixed effects with year
dummies. Since our data contain observations for the same country pair over
time, we correct the standard errors for correlation within country pairs.
Table 4
Standard gravity equation
Dep.var.: Ln value of bilateral imports
Aggregate Imports Differentiated Goods Homogeneous Goods
Variable (S1) (S2) (S3) (S4) (S5) (S6)
Ln Distance -0.986*** -0.732*** -0.837*** -0.551*** -0.998*** -0.864***
(0.087) (0.071) (0.087) (0.064) (0.13) (0.13)
Adjacency 0.412*** -0.154 0.543*** -0.0700 1.050*** 0.602***
(0.14) (0.10) (0.14) (0.12) (0.18) (0.19)
Both country in same FTA 0.0805 -0.00385 0.0342 -0.0621 0.453*** 0.375***
(0.052) (0.044) (0.059) (0.047) (0.10) (0.10)
Direct communication -0.679 -0.136 -0.256
(0.51) (0.26) (1.01)
Open-circuit communication 1.145** 0.747*** 0.911
(0.49) (0.24) (0.81)
Common legal origin 0.418*** 0.401*** 0.452***
(0.069) (0.069) (0.13)
Religious proximity 0.166 0.284** 0.121
(0.12) (0.12) (0.24)
Ethnic ties 0.223*** 0.233*** 0.0914**
(0.026) (0.025) (0.043)
Observations 10,560 10,560 7,826 7,826 7,161 7,161
AdjustedR2 0.892 0.914 0.890 0.914 0.735 0.745
RMSE 0.834 0.746 0.798 0.706 1.235 1.210
All regressions contain exporter × year and importer × year fixed effects. Standard errors (in
brackets) have been adjusted for clustering around country pairs. *,**,*** denote statistical signif-
icance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Sample sizes differ between aggregate trade,
differentiated goods, and homogeneous goods due to the existence of zero values and missings in
disaggregated trade data.
19 We report findings for Rauch’s conservative aggregation scheme (which mini-
mizes the number of goods that are classified as either traded on an organized
exchange or reference priced). Our results remain qualitatively similar if the lib-
eral aggregation scheme is used. Results for Rauch’s third category, reference-priced
goods, are very similar to those for homogeneous goods and available upon request.
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Column (S1) in Table 4 reports a parsimonious benchmark equation for ag-
gregate trade, which does not include the cultural proximity variables. In line
with existing research, the elasticity of bilateral trade with respect to geo-
graphical distance is very close to unity. Also the effect of a common border
(adjacency) is of familiar size: all else equal, neighboring countries trade about
41% more than countries without a common border. In contrast, column (S1)
suggests that a free trade area does not increase trade between its members;
this is a common result in this type of setup (Baier and Bergstrand, 2007).
Column (S2) adds direct and open-circuit communication, common origin of
the legal system, ethnic ties and religious proximity as measures of cultural
proximity into the regression. The presence of these variables reduces the im-
portance of geography: the distance coefficient falls from unity to about 0.73,
while adjacency now turns out to reduce trade – albeit at marginal statisti-
cal significance. Two countries in which translation, if required, is supposed
to be costless, trade about 115% more. Direct communication does not influ-
ence bilateral trade between European countries. 20 A common legal system
boosts trade by 42% and an increase in the migrant population by 1 percent-
age point turns out to boost bilateral trade by 0.22 percentage points. Again,
these magnitudes are in line with findings in the literature.
Columns (S3) to (S6) repeat the above exercise for the subaggregates of differ-
entiated and homogeneous goods. Since the independent variable has been con-
structed from fairly disaggregated trade data in which missing values abound,
the number of observations is lower than for aggregate data. 21 A couple of
differences between the two subaggregates stand out. First, geography-based
variables matter more strongly for homogeneous goods. This is not surprising,
since the higher elasticity of substitution for homogeneous goods drives up
parameter estimates; see equation (7). This pattern carries over, albeit at a
lower extent, to common legal system. However, the effect of ethnic ties is
20 Notice that the direct communication variable is mainly composed by zero values
in our sample of European countries. This may reflect the differences to the re-
sults reported by Melitz (2008), who draws on a sample with much larger country
coverage.
21 Aggregate bilateral data has been constructed by the IMF. In that data base,
many missing values are imputed by experts.
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much smaller with homogeneous goods and the effects of open-circuit commu-
nication and religious proximity – statistically significant with differentiated
goods – disappear with homogeneous goods. We may conclude that the evi-
dence hints at a much larger role of cultural proximity for differentiated goods
than for homogeneous ones.
4.2 The role of ESC scores for bilateral trade volumes
The variables included in Table 4 – while reflecting cultural proximity – may
do so imperfectly (especially since they are time-constant and symmetric).
Further, they may also foster trade directly by reducing communication costs.
In this subsection we extend the above analysis and include ESC scores as
an additional explanatory variable in the gravity framework. ESC scores af-
fect trade only through cultural proximity, since there is no direct effect on
contracting and negotiation costs. Table 5 reports our results.
Let us first focus on country i′s aggregate imports from j (columns (S1) to
(S3)). Specification (S1) regresses i′s imports on the scores that i allots to j.
Specification (S2) instead inverts the direction of scoring and uses the ESC
scores that j awards to i. Column (S3) uses both directions in a single equation.
We include a dummy Dijt that takes the value of one if ESCijt > 0 and zero
otherwise (similarly for ESCjit).
22 In all models, the ESC variables turn out
statistically highly significant and positive. Measures for the more conventional
cultural variables such as common language, legal system, religious proximity,
and ethnic ties continue to matter, their marginal effects being slightly smaller
than those reported in regressions without the ESC scores.
In section 2.2, we have argued that cultural proximity may have a low degree
of reciprocity. This conjecture implies that high scores awarded by country
i to j should foster i′s imports from j, but high scores awarded by j to i
need not increase i′s imports (but rather j′s). This hypothesis is confirmed
22 We do not report the estimates of Dijt since it is mostly insignificant. We owe this
dummy variable strategy to an anonymous referee. The bilateral trade variable is
in fact not affected by the failure to rank songs below 1 to 10 so that our estimation
strategy is not plagued by non-random sampling.
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in specification (S2). The coefficient on the ESCjit variable is positive, but
smaller and estimated with a lower degree of precision than the ESCijt variable
in (S1). The effect on aggregate imports of moving the ESC for the importing
country from 0 to 1 is 14.9% in specification (S1). The effect of the ESC scores
for the exporting country is 9.53% in specification (S2).
Specification (S3) uses both ESC variables simultaneously in the same regres-
sion. Estimated coefficients are strikingly close to those obtained separately
in columns (S1) and (S2). This fact can be interpreted as a lack of strong
correlation between ESCijt and ESCjit and therefore as a sign of low reci-
procity. Moreover, country i′s imports receive a stronger boost from higher
realizations of ESCijt than ESCjit. An F-test on the difference between the
two estimates of the ESC scores in specification (S3) does not allow rejecting
the conclusion that this difference is statistically zero. But the fact that both
variables enter signficantly and simultaneously argues the other way.
Columns (S4) to (S6) and (S7) to (S9) repeat this exercise for differentiated
and homogeneous goods, respectively. Results for the subaggregate of differen-
tiated goods are comparable to those for aggregate trade. Results for homoge-
neous goods, however, are different. Most strikingly, we find that ESC scores
matter for trade in differentiated goods regardless of the exact specification of
the model, while they are irrelevant for trade in homogeneous goods. Moving
the ESC for the importing country from 0 to 1 impacts trade in differentiated
goods by 16.6% in specification (S4). The effect of the ESC scores for the
exporting country is 10.3% in specification (S5).
The failure of ESC scores to show up significantly in the specifications explain-
ing trade in homogeneous goods is in contrast to the conventional measures of
cultural proximity, such as common legal origin and ethnic ties whose effects
on bilateral trade come out positive and statistically significant. Moreover,
the adjacency variable turn out significant for trade of homogeneous goods. 23
The literature suggests that informal trade costs, such as those represented by
23 FTA membership seems to matter for homogeneous goods, but is unimportant
for trade in differentiated goods. This is a surprising and interesting result that
may be worth further investigation.
20
cultural distance should matter more for complex differentiated goods, which
are difficult to contract over. Middlemen selling homogeneous goods usually
do not reveal the country of production, so that the operation of a preference
channel would be hard to defend. Taking the extreme position that cultural
proximity is entirely irrelevant for homogeneous goods, the conventional in-
dicators must affect trade costs through a mechanism unrelated to cultural
proximity. Hence, this evidence supports the interpretation of ESC scores as
operating strictly through an influence on tastes.
Following Anderson and van Wincoop (2004), we can also interpret the ESC
coefficients in term of an accross-the-board tariff equivalent. In order to do
this we assume that the elasticity of substitution to 6 for aggregate trade, to
4 for differentiated goods, and to 12 for homogeneous goods. Thus, moving
ESCijt scores from 0 to 1 is equivalent to reducing tariff by 2.37 for aggre-
gate imports (0.142 × 100/6) and by 4.1 percentage points for differentiated
products (0.163× 100/4).
5 Extensions
In this section we present a number of critical extensions dealing with the
endogeneity of cultural proximity and the omitted variable problem. We also
present several robustness checks to assess our main results.
5.1 Controlling for endogeneity
There is a growing theoretical literature on the endogenous emergence and
evolution of cultural identities (see the recent surveys by Fernandez, 2007 and
Guiso et al., 2009). This literature identifies determinants that drive both
economic outcomes and cultural traits. In the context of the present paper,
positive shocks on bilateral trade volumes could lead to cultural convergence
so that two countries end up with a higher degree of cultural proximity than
before the shock. Regressing ESC scores on lagged bilateral trade (imports,
21
exports, or the sum thereof), and controlling for dyadic fixed effects, we do
not find any first-order evidence for endogeneity. This result is confirmed in
a number of models that differ with respect to their treatment of the non-
linearity of ESC scores (OLS, Tobit, and Poisson). But while this evidence is
suggestive, it is not a rigorous proof on the absence of endogeneity. It is still
possible that OLS estimates suffer from simultaneity bias. Dealing with the
simultaneity problem requires an instrumentation strategy.
Following Combes et al. (2005), we exploit the time structure of our data to
estimate the effect of an exogenous change in cultural proximity. It is reason-
able to assume that past ESC scores (e.g., dating from t− 5), are not causally
affected by current bilateral trade volumes (at time t). In other words, current
shocks in the gravity equation are uncorrelated to lagged ESC values. Then,
past ESC scores are valid instruments, provided that they predict current
scores sufficiently well.
Table 6 presents instrumental variable 2SLS regressions. 24 As usual, we com-
pare aggregate trade, trade in differentiated goods, and trade in homogeneous
goods and either use ESCijt and ESCjit separately (specifications (1), (2),
(4), (5), (7), (8)) or simultaneously (specifications (3), (6), and (9)). The
first-stage regressions typically have F-statistics well beyond the usual rule-
of-thumb value of 10. We also report the Durbin and Wu-Hausman statistics.
They do not allow to test exogeneity of the regressors per se, but whether the
coefficients of more-efficient OLS estimation differ significantly from the coef-
ficients of consistent but less efficient 2SLS estimation. Typically, we have to
reject exogeneity at high degrees of significance; specifications (S5) and (S8)
are notable exceptions. Hence, in general, instrumentation is required, and the
proposed instrumentation strategy is valid. 25
The IV results confirm a positive and significant effect of ESC scores on bilat-
eral trade. Typically, the regressions reveal that the country i′s imports are
24 Results based on GMM or limited information maximum likelihood methods
perform very similarly.
25 The first stage regressions signal that 5-year lags of scores are valid instruments.
Shorter lag structures work as well, but to the extent that bilateral trade flows are
persistent, are less suited as instruments. Longer lags yield first stage regressions
with fairly low F statistics.
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more strongly spurred by higher realizations of ESCijt than of ESCjit, which
confirms a finding presented in Table 5. However, as the χ2 tests on equality
of coefficients performed in columns (3), (6) and (9) show, we do not always
have strong statistical evidence for the differential impact of these two vari-
ables. Also note that the χ2 test on ESCijt = ESCijt = 0 typically fails, so
that cultural proximity of some type always matters in the proposed models.
The IV results imply that OLS biases the effect of ESC scores downwards. On
the one hand, one would expect that a positive shock on trade increases cul-
tural proximity. However, on the other hand, it is important to notice that the
IV-regressions not only remedy a potential endogeneity bias, they also help
to deal with measurement error, which biases OLS estimates towards zero.
While our analysis leaves little doubt on the meaningfulness of ESC scores as
measures of cultural proximity, it is also obvious that these scores are very
noisy proxies.
Guiso et al. (2009) and Combes et al. (2005) also discuss attempts to use IV
strategies in similar setups, where the level of bilateral economic activity is
regressed on various measures of bilateral trust or information. Both papers
find that OLS strongly underestimates the true causal effects, just as we find
in our 2SLS regressions. Both papers conclude that ‘reverse causality is not
a major problem’. This is a strong conclusion; however, we have found no
contradictory evidence.
5.2 Controlling for unobserved factors
The volume of trade between two countries and the degree of cultural proxim-
ity between them may both depend on bilateral factors that remain unobserved
by the econometrician. Often, these factors are related to initial conditions.
There are at least three examples of unobserved factors that may be relevant
in the context of this paper.
First, cross-border transactions require and condition social interactions be-
tween individuals, which may change their incentives to acquire certain skills
or invest in certain networks. For example, interactions with foreign trading
24
partners at some initial point in time might lead to mutual learning, which
may trigger convergence of cultural characteristics as certain norms or behav-
ioral standards are adopted. In turn, this generates more trade, potentially
through both the trade cost and the preference channel. Hence, current lev-
els of bilateral trade and cultural proximity positively depend on the initial
degree of cultural proximity. This, in turn, means that failing to control for
initial conditions distorts estimates upwards due to omitted variable bias.
A second problem, closely related to the first, is habit formation. The pref-
erence for a country’s specific varieties may be stronger if the representative
consumer in the partner country already heavily consumes those varieties.
Again, it is the unobserved initial bilateral trade volume that may have led to
the endogenous formation of consumption habits and, hence, bias estimates.
Third, the volume of trade between two countries and the degree of cultural
proximity between them may both depend on geographical factors. For exam-
ple, bilateral migration between two countries may affect cultural proximity
and trade alike. However, one set of determinants for migration is geographical
distance or adjacency – two factors that we can easily control for. The other
set of determinants has to do with income levels, and those depend on mul-
tilateral trade and not bilateral trade. In our regressions we also control for
aggregate trade, since we have included country × year fixed effects. However,
there may be remaining unobserved bilateral determinants of migration.
One way to deal with initial conditions is to use dyad-specific fixed effects. In
the presence of those effects, the influence of the ESC scores depends entirely
on their movement over time. The cross-sectional effects of the scores are
absorbed by the dyadic fixed effects. Baier and Bergstrand (2007) successfully
use this strategy in the gravity equation context. We estimate the following
‘dyadic fixed effects equation’ (DFEE) model:
lnMijt = ηESCijt + ϕ¯FTAijt + νit + νjt + νij +Dijt + εijt, (8)
where νij denotes the comprehensive set of country-pair specific fixed effects.
Compared to equation (7), the inclusion of νij makes all time-invariant bi-
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lateral determinants redundant. In particular, variables such as common lan-
guage, common legal origin, etc., of trade flows drop out.
Table 7 reports the results from running regression (8) on our data set. As al-
ways, we differentiate between aggregate trade, trade in differentiated goods,
and trade in homogeneous goods, but also between ESC scores for the import-
ing and the exporting country. Since identification of the coefficients draws
only on time variance, it becomes more difficult to find significant results.
Yet with dyadic and country × year fixed effects included in the regression,
we still find that ESC scores retain a positive and statistically significant in-
fluence on bilateral trade but only the in the case of trade in differentiated
goods and only for country i’s imports from j; see columns (S4) and (S5). The
significant influence on bilateral trade in differentiated goods – now smaller
than before – also holds up when both ESC measures are used simultaneously
in the regression; see column (S6). Moving ESCijt scores from 0 to 1 would
be equivalent to reducing an ad valorem tariff by 1.20 percentage points in
specification (S6). 26
5.3 Additional robustness checks
We have carried out two additional robustness checks, which can be consulted
in the web appendix to this paper. One has to do with the switch from jury-
based voting to televoting which occurred in 1998. Since our data extends
from 1975 to 2003, one may wonder whether our results are driven by this
switch in the rules of the contest. Table 1 shows regression results for the
period 1975-1998, thereby drawing only on scores established by juries rather
than by televoting. Our main results remain fully intact qualitatively. The total
pro-trade effect of cultural proximity turns out slightly lower. The effect of the
ESC scores for the exporting country turns out insignificant. For homogeneous
goods, there is no robust effect of cultural proximity on trade, as in the main
body of the paper.
26 0.0479×100/4.
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One may also question to what extent our results are driven by changes in
bilateral migration stocks. The country that sent most immigrants to Europe
during the period under investigation has been Turkey. Most of Turkish em-
igrants went to Germany. The bilateral stocks of immigrants at the start of
our sample changed little since then due to restrictive immigration policies
(Boeri and Bru¨cker, 2005). Another test we provide then is to exclude is to
exclude the dyad-specific fixed effects for Turkey as the sending country and
to leave out the German-Turkish pair from our regressions in Table 2. The
results resemble the earlier ones with all of the dyadic-specific effects.
6 Conclusions
There are many anecdotal hints that cultural proximity is a major determinant
of bilateral trade volumes. However, empirical quantification and testing are
difficult due to the elusiveness of the concept and lack of observability. The
existing literature tries to account for cultural proximity by including vari-
ables such as common language, common legal origins, religious proximity, or
ethnic ties. These indicators are certainly connected to cultural affinity be-
tween nations; they do, however, also capture other things related to the cost
of contracting and negotiation that do not have anything to do with culture.
We show that there is more to cultural proximity than what the conventional
variables allow.
In this paper we draw on bilateral score data from the Eurovision Song Contest
(ESC), a very popular pan-European television show, to construct a measure
of cultural proximity which varies over time and within country pairs, and that
correlates strongly with conventional indicators. Within the framework of a
theory-grounded gravity model, we show that our measure positively affects
trade in differentiated goods, even after controlling for the conventional mea-
sures used in the literature. Further, ESC scores do not add any explanatory
power to gravity equations for goods that are traded on organized exchanges
while the conventional indicators continue to matter. This is perfectly sensible.
Since cultural proximity should not matter when direct contacts between sell-
28
ers and buyers are not required. This finding suggests that ESC scores indeed
reflect cultural proximity alone while the standard variables are also related
to the costs of negotiating and contracting.
These results are surprisingly robust. We are able to reject that they are
driven by simultaneity bias. They also survive the inclusion of country-pair
specific fixed effects so that our baseline findings are not due to the omission of
unobserved factors neither. Hence, our study highlights the overall importance
of cultural proximity as well as the role of its time-varying and asymmetric
nature for the determination of bilateral trade volumes.
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1 Summary Statistics and Data Sources
Our dataset and the web appendix can be downloaded at http://team.univ-
paris1.fr/teamperso/toubal/papers/CP/CP.html.
Aggregate imports. Aggregate bilateral import flows (measured c.i.f.)
are from the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics (DoTS) CDROM (July 2006
edition) for the period 1975-2003.
Trade in differentiated and homogeneous goods. The data has been
constructed by aggregating SITC4 rev. 2 trade data (c.i.f.) prepared by Feen-
stra et al. (2005) according to Rauch’s (1999) ‘conservative’ classification of 4
digit SITC goods for the period 1975-2000.
Raw ESC scores. Data are from http://www.kolumbus.fi/jarpen/.
An alternative website is http://nul-points.net/.
Adjusted ESC scores. Adjusted ESC scores are the residual of a regres-
sion of raw ESC scores on a set of song dummies.
Conventional measures of cultural proximity. We are very thankful
to Jacques Melitz for sharing his data on languages. The variables have been
computed as in Melitz (2008). We add Russian to his major direct communi-
cation languages since we have bilateral trade data for Russia. The measure
‘common legal origin’ is taken from La Porta et al. (1999) and distinguishes
between a Latin, a Scandinavian, a British, and a Germanic system.
Following Alesina et al. (2000), ‘religious proximity’ is constructed as follows:
Using mid-1990ies Census data 27 , we compute the shares sri of adherents
to religion r ( Catholics, Protestants, orthodox Christians, Muslims, Jews,
atheists, and non-religious persons) in total population of country i. Then,
we compute a bilateral index ρij =
∑
r srisrj, with ρij ∈ [0, 1] . This measure
reaches a maximum value of 0.85 for the dyad Poland-Malta, and is minimum,
0.001, for the pair Poland-Turkey.
27 The data are freely available on www.worldchristiandatabase.org and coincide
closely with entries in the CIA fact book and other sources.
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As a measure of ethnic ties, we use the stock of foreign born individuals
by country of birth, provided by the OECD and discussed in Dumont and
Lemaitre (2005). Our regressions include the natural logarithm of that stock.
Geographical data. Geographical distance and adjacency are from the
CEPII in Paris. 28
Free trade agreements. Data is from Baier and Bergstrand (2006) and
updated to account for the pre-EU membership Europe agreements signed by
East European countries with the EU (WTO website).
28 The CEPII data can be downloaded from
www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm.
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2.1 Time behavior of multilateral ESC scores
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Fig. 1. Time profiles of multilateral scores obtained by countries.
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Table 1
Taking into account the change in ESC’s rules
Televoting versus jury decision
Variables Aggregate Differentiated Homogeneous
Import Goods Goods
ESCijt 0.116** 0.120** 0.134
(0.046) (0.051) (0.093)
ESCjit 0.0507 0.0617 -0.0319
(0.048) (0.052) (0.087)
Ln Distance -0.599*** -0.479*** -0.855***
(0.073) (0.064) (0.13)
Adjacency -0.0706 -0.0279 0.637***
(0.10) (0.12) (0.20)
Both country in same FTA 0.0170 -0.0252 0.378***
(0.044) (0.047) (0.11)
Direct communication -0.621 -0.104 -0.263
(0.55) (0.27) (1.06)
Open-circuit communication 1.051** 0.724*** 0.963
(0.51) (0.24) (0.86)
Common legal origin 0.399*** 0.393*** 0.437***
(0.074) (0.072) (0.14)
Religious proximity 0.188 0.247** 0.0632
(0.13) (0.13) (0.25)
Ethnic ties 0.227*** 0.241*** 0.0826*
(0.029) (0.027) (0.049)
Observations 7,698 6,499 6,021
Adusted R2 0.920 0.917 0.744
RMSE 0.690 0.681 1.207
All regressions contain dyadic (i.e. country-pair) fixed effects, as well as
exporter × year and importer × year fixed effects and dummy variables
to control for the instances of ESCijt = 0 and ESCjit = 0. Standard
errors (in brackets) have been adjusted for clustering around country
pairs. *,**,*** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent
levels, respectively. Sample sizes differ between aggregate trade, differen-
tiated goods, and homogeneous goods due to the existence of zero values
and missings in disaggregated trade data.
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Table 2
Migration and ESC scores
Without the German-Turkish pair
Variables Aggregate Differentiated Homogeneous
Import Goods Goods
ESCijt 0.140*** 0.148*** 0.0885
(0.043) (0.049) (0.085)
ESCjit 0.0551 0.0904* 0.00811
(0.047) (0.052) (0.084)
Ln Distance -0.780*** -0.584*** -0.872***
(0.068) (0.064) (0.14)
Adjacency -0.109 0.0217 0.720***
(0.10) (0.12) (0.20)
Both country in same FTA 0.00115 -0.0392 0.379***
(0.045) (0.045) (0.11)
Direct communication -0.503 -0.112 -0.384
(0.46) (0.28) (0.99)
Open-circuit communication 1.093** 0.665*** 0.903
(0.46) (0.25) (0.80)
Common legal origin 0.368*** 0.384*** 0.331**
(0.065) (0.068) (0.14)
Religious proximity 0.114 0.275** 0.118
(0.12) (0.12) (0.24)
Ethnic ties 0.228*** 0.219*** 0.107**
(0.025) (0.026) (0.045)
Observations 9,610 7,286 6,651
Adusted R2 0.917 0.913 0.748
RMSE 0.723 0.699 1.204
All regressions contain dyadic (i.e. country-pair) fixed effects, as well as
exporter × year and importer × year fixed effects and dummy variables
to control for the instances of ESCijt = 0 and ESCjit = 0. Standard
errors (in brackets) have been adjusted for clustering around country
pairs. *,**,*** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent
levels, respectively. Sample sizes differ between aggregate trade, differen-
tiated goods, and homogeneous goods due to the existence of zero values
and missings in disaggregated trade data.
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